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ABSTRACT
There are countless occasions where marginalized groups bear witness to language-based
discriminatory practices. Language, as defined here, is a species of symbolism. After reviewing
the sociological literature, the term “microaggressions” appears to best describe the phenomena
in its everyday occurrences. Microaggressions are “the brief and commonplace daily verbal,
behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that
communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial, gender, sexual-orientation, and religious
slights and insults to the target person or group” (Sue, Capodilupo, et al., 2007; Sue, 2010). Sue
classifies microaggressions into three forms: microassaults, microinsults, microinvalidations.
The purpose of the project was tri-fold. By an analogous process of inference and conjecture, I
demonstrate how Sue’s taxonomy of microaggressive forms are grades of subjective intensity
that are presupposed, if not conceptually integrated. First, an overview of the theory of double
consciousness and the literature on microaggressions is presented. Six participants were
interviewed, analyzed and then classified into Sue’s taxonomy. Responses indicated that
microaggressions are real despite their subtle, phantasmal and illusory nature. Additional
findings suggest that Sue’s microaggressive forms may not only be categorical, but also the locus
of a proposition, or ‘lure for feeling.’ Implications for these subtle intensities are considered,
then compared and contrasted with a transmutated concept of Du Boisian double consciousness
to demonstrate through a theory of perception the limitations of Sue’s Microaggression Process
Model. Examples from popular culture are considered throughout the study for added clarity.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

We live in the midst of a seemingly “post-racial” era in which the United States, with its
documented history of racial atrocities, has elected its first African American president. With
this, some argue that the concept of race is no longer important, or that it does not play a
significant role in the shaping of lives and culture. The problem is precisely this seemingly
aspect. Instead of the deliberate, overt and explicit discriminatory practices that happened in the
past, in these years of the Obama era, racial prejudices and biases occur on more subtle levels.
Derogatory epithets like “nigger,” “porch monkey,” “jungle bunny” and “coon” are no longer
openly accepted. Although the gains of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements, Gay and
Lesbian, Student Antiwar and Third World Movements slowly forced such terms from use, they
were ultimately replaced by other slights. In other words, centuries-old forms of blatant, “oldfashioned” racism have morphed into subtle, seemingly invisible, ephemeral forms of
oppression.
Conservatives and many liberals today argue, that, “Jim [and Jane] Crowism is over,” and
that people of color, especially African Americans, are the ones responsible for perpetuating the
“race problem.” While African Americans have made some racial progress on the fronts of
education, housing, and access to opportunity, racism is far from dead. There remains an
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inheritable relic from the past that is capable of advancing and perpetuating its detrimental
realities. This tension between de facto separatist practices, coupled with the undeniable aspects
of racial progress (e.g. people aren’t being lynched every day, African American president, etc.)
is what I am claiming creates a virtual reality, rather than an enriching one. Virtual reality is
what I have come to understand as the contradictory and conflicting worldview that generates
both distorted and secondary realities. An enriching reality is one that disrupts the sense of
permanence that often dominates thinking. Rather, it avoids the idiosyncrasies of particular
modes or schools of thought.
After reviewing the sociological literature, the term “microaggression” appears to best
describe the idea of virtuality that is meant. Microaggressions are subtle, conscious or
unconscious, verbal and nonverbal, intentional or unintentional, delivered slights, insults and
invalidations that send denigrating messages to marginalized persons or groups (Sue, 2010: 40).
There is a perfect illustration of this experience in The Souls of Black Folk (1903) where Du Bois
writes:
I remember well when the shadow swept across me. I was a little thing, away up
in the hills of New England, where the dark Housatonic winds between Hoosac
and Taghkanic to the sea. In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put it into the
boys’ and girls’ heads to buy gorgeous visiting-cards—ten cent a package—and
exchange. The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my
card,—refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it dawned upon me with a
certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart
and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil (emphasis added;
2003:5).
This particular passage contains the “sense-experience” or “feeling” of a racist microaggression.
Certainly, Du Bois attributes her refusal to his race and not, for instance, to something that he
cannot put his finger on. Microaggressions are experienced by people of color as “real,”
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“tangible,” and “direct.” The goal of this thesis will be discussing instances of its many
occasions. However, it is also the case that microaggressions can be spun and interpreted in
different ways which do not directly point to race as the source of the slight though it may be.
The historical development of this concept is, in fact, indispensable to our explaining of
Sue’s Microaggression Process Model (2010: 65-86). There, Sue identifies and summarizes five
domain (phases) that are likely to occur during a potential racial microaggression. The five
domains include: Incident, Perception, Reaction, Interpretation, and Consequence.
In the above excerpt, we witness a microaggression at its inception⎯the “Incident Phase”
of Sue’s taxonomy (i.e., as the raw data of sense perception), or as a “certain suddenness,” as Du
Bois recalls it. Du Bois’s experience occurs many years before it is given the academic
euphemism “microaggression.” We are simply pointing out the sense experience of the
microaggression at its inception. As presented in the above-mentioned excerpt, it is simply an
uncomfortable, awkward or even embarrassing moment, yet a feeling and sensation that is
coupled now with a perception of black-white relations nonetheless.
There is another helpful example of this phase in Toni Morrison’s work The Bluest Eye.
There, the narrator in the novel, a nine-year-old girl named Claudia, highlights how abstract
symbols work as conceptualizations during perception. With this illustration, we come into
contact with the objectification of unintended consequences through Claudia’s experience. It
reads:
Frieda and I are washing Mason jars. We do not hear their words, but with
grown-ups we listen to and watch out for their voices. . . . The edge, the curl, the
thrust of their emotions is always clear to me and Frieda. We do not, cannot,
know the meanings of all their words, for we are nine and ten years old. So we
watch their faces, their hands, their feet, and listen for truth in timbre.
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Needless to say, the dialectical method is a particular way of viewing the world. And Claudia
appears to have discovered a least one of its principles, which is the relation between how adult
expressions and posturing are pitted against her own. Here, Morrison’s example demonstrates
how the unintended consequences of gestures and tones can generate distorted realities during an
initial stage of experience. From the sound of the adult’s inharmonic temperament and
behavioral habits, to Claudia and her sister’s understood meaning of those sounds and gestures,
back to the adult’s own perspectives, lies a double contrast and, an analogical standpoint of two
different contrasts. My goal is to help adequately situate what may already appear to the reader
as integrated, or that which has not already unwittingly been discounted or presupposed as “not
given.” In other words, it has been taken-for-granted. Although Sue’s Model, for reasons to be
explored later, is much better than good, I interrogate his phase “Perception” in order to
demonstrate how we may better understand the growth of experiencing occasions and the
accretion of value as they apply to our feelings (i.e., like in Du Bois and Claudia’s case), as
initial physical feelings that evade our acts of judging. As a thesis project, we look at how the
world of data during this “outside-in” and “inside-out” process of the collection of can generate
virtual realities. In other words, the subject-predicate contrast is a fundamental sense of division
that finds its way into subjectivity.
During the growth of our experiencing occasions, we operate by an “outside-in⎯insideout” cognitive process. This process deals with not only a notion of generic contrast, but
moreover, it is applicable to the actual and potential world. The process can be best described in
relation to “outside-in” as “whole to parts,” and “inside-out” as “parts to whole.” Respectively,
it is an “input-output” phenomenon. Given this, I will spend considerable time developing a
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theory of ingression to help better explain how perception can sometimes work. Ingression is
“the functioning of one actual entity in the self-creation of another actual entity” (Whitehead,
1978:23). Thus, it is a particular mode in which the potentiality of an eternal object is realized in
a particular actual entity […] (Ibid., p. 23). What I mean to suggest here is that the feelings
involved during the actual occasion of an individual’s ultimate purpose, is an aim that gains
satisfaction in a particular mode of ingression. This particular mode of ingression, as discussed
here in this paper, is a perspective by which the subject prehends. I find it important to mention
here, that, by no means am I (nor would I) advocate for such a perspective. Perspectivals have
limits. Yet, it is moreover a standpoint. And because it is a standpoint, it is of the essence to
assist in its virtual integration.
This is not to say that phases three, four, and five, i.e., “Reaction,” “Interpretation,” and
“Consequence,” respectively, are irrelevant, or insignificant. Rather, my goal is simply to show
how a sensation functions as a proposition, or lure for feeling” (Ibid., p. 184) The feeling felt, I
argue, meets its categoreal demands of microaggression as the objective datum arises from the
past like a haunting. In other words, it is a potential reaction. Although the “incident phase”
constitutes a “situation experienced,” it also contains an “object intervened” during the
microaggression process given its history.
Sue does provide us various ways of looking at the situation experienced through groupspecific microaggressions. He also explores these categories as they operate in the areas of
education, employment, medicine, law, housing, etc. My claim, however, is that he does not
adequately explain an “inside-out” method of looking at the same event through his
microaggressions forms.
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In Sue’s taxonomy, he provides readers with three ways to classify microaggressions.
The forms include: microassaults, microinsults, and microinvalidations. Given this, I argue that
the Model does not provide an adequate perspective for the individual experiencing the
microaggression. How can an individual develop this capacity?
Each of Sue’s forms is like its own camera lens, or “microaggressive form” which allows
for limited levels of analysis and interpretation. The problem is that each form has its own
intensity for detection or perception, with microinvalidation being the subtlest; and therefore, the
most abstract and potentially harmful. In fact, giving an analysis at this level depicts instances
sometimes as “illusory,” “haunting,” and “virtual.” Therefore, the “perception” phase becomes
the main concern of this thesis project because (1) microinvalidations are subtle, (2) a part of
perception, and (3) understudied, and more importantly (4) an especially interesting and
meaningful cite of investigation for exploration of microaggressions.
In order to understand the ghostly and enigmatic nature of microaggressions, we can use
William Edward Burghardt Du Bois’s (1868-1963) concept of double consciousness. The theory
of double consciousness describes nearly identical circumstances of microaggressions’
“contentious,” “ghostly,” “illusory,” and “haunting” nature. Here, I adopt the theory to help
highlight the hidden and unconscious factors of an “outside-in”/ “inside-out” transmission of
experience. In the course of this discussion, I demonstrate how transition from the incident
phase to the perception phase is sociologically important but poorly understood. What I mean
here is that the feeling felt during the incident phase of a microaggression is largely neglected in
the literature but is vital to an understanding of microaggressions. Because each particular
microaggression that Sue describes in his taxonomy is complex and distinct in its intensities, it
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follows that each occasion is not only novel to that specific occasion, but specific to each
microaggressive form. My claim is that given the intensity of a microaggressive felt, we can
expect to see variations in interpretations in relation to its various forms. My study seeks to
explore this issue empirically by the following speculative-methodological stance. I begin by
giving an exposition of Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness and an articulation of Sue’s
theory of microaggressive forms. Using a theory of perception, I show how one is actualized in
the other. Additionally, I have provided several popular culture examples. In particular, I have
chosen the recent depictions of LeBron James and Mario Balotelli as King Kong as my central
focus to have some support for the view which I am refuting in my conclusion. In the following
section, six empirical cases are provided as examples of microaggressive forms as theorized by
Sue. Here, we are introduced to an irreducible perspective of generic contrasts in Sue’s theory.
In the concluding sections, I demonstrate how the general dispositions of Sue’s microaggressive
forms and intensities can generate a transmutable concept of Du Boisian double consciousness
that needs to be refuted.
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CHAPTER II
THEORY OF DU BOISIAN DOUBLE COUNSCIOUSNESS

The theory of double consciousness, perhaps W. E. B. Du Bois’s most well known
theoretical contribution, contains an astounding number of insights into the experience of race
and racial identity. As Cornel West describes it, double consciousness is “the dialectic of black
self-recognition [oscillating] between being in America but not of it, from being black natives to
black aliens” (West, 1999: 58). But this is not all. The theory has other subtle, seemingly
nonexistent hindrances that operate more subtly. While Du Bois does not explicitly elaborate
this point, implications of this claim can be seen throughout his oeuvre. In “Of Our Spiritual
Strivings,” the opening chapter of The Souls of Black Folk (1903), Du Bois gives us a succinct
idea of his experience.
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by
some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly
framing it. They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or
compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a
problem? they say, I know an excellent colored man in my town, or, I fought at
Mechanicsville; or, Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At
these I smile, or am interested, or reduced the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion
may require. To the real question, How does it feel to be a problem? I answer
seldom a word.
And yet, being a problem is a strange experience,—peculiar even for one who has
never been anything else, save perhaps in babyhood. . . . (Du Bois, 2003: 7).
It is precisely this residue of similar but subtle, enigmatic message forms that continue to
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characterize many African American experiences today. A fundamental component of Du Bois’s
theory of double consciousness is that African Americans experience the world quite differently
from European Americans. Notice that Du Bois shifts the “framing” of the original utterances of
white folks’ speech acts in order to get at what he refers to as “the real question,” which is “How
does it feel to be a problem?” By finessing the framing, Du Bois highlights a very important
aspect of semantic pragmatics, which is: valuation and the distinction between race-based
interpretive differences.
Central to Du Bois’s query is the concept of white folks’ frame of reference. This points
towards how things had to have been situated not only behaviorally, but cognitively. Utterances
during slavery and the Jim and Jane Crow era were simply communicative apparatuses that white
folks used as directives for their hierarchical worldview. To comply with white authority was
not only expected, but was registered as the verbal (speech) or nonverbal (thought) norm.
Message forms no doubt must have played out in an etiquette that divided ideals into “normal”
versus “deviant,” or “active” and “passive” ideological frameworks. Given this, the former
conceptual framework imposes a sense of aesthetic valuation and normativity on the latter
alternative conceptual framework. Needless to say, scholars who used white theory and practice
had the racial privilege to neglect, dismiss, ignore, and eclipse other alternative conceptual
frameworks. This not only proves to be psychologically advantageous to white folk per se, but it
is disadvantageous to cultural harmony.
In considering the ways that double consciousness develops in general, oppression
appears to be a least one ingredient. Such a concentration on only the self-interest and epistemic
grid of a few comes at the sacrifice of wider interests and the broader cultural good. As Charles
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Mills puts it in Blackness Visible, “[a] relationship to the world that is founded on racial privilege
becomes simply the relationship to the world” (Mills, 1998: 10). This imagery helped establish
white theory as an epistemology of normativity. For blacks, any deviation from white directives
has been in the past viewed as insubordinate and the grounds for incarceration, torture, or death.
Needless to say, this helped spread radically different worldviews between whites and blacks.
Du Bois repeatedly alluded to this fact when referring to black American experiences: “one ever
feels, his two-ness . . . [his existential predicament] two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body . . .” (Souls, p. 9). We are all too familiar with the
crippling effects of this dark past, and sadly, this fracturing condition may be more common
across races than ever before. Robert Gooding-Williams is helpful in highlighting this idea in his
recent work In the Shadow of Du Bois (2009) where he writes:
Judgments and strivings predicated on American ideals will conflict with
judgments and strivings predicated on Negro ideals, for where the latter
judgments and strivings pertain to an accurate picture of Negro life, the former
pertain to an inaccurate picture that derives from double consciousness. Except
for the condition of double consciousness, American ideals would not “war” with
Negro ideals, because except for the condition of double consciousness, American
ideals and Negro ideals would not give rise to conflicting judgments and strivings.
[. . .] double consciousness is a causally necessary condition of conflictual twoness, for the condition of double consciousness is required to engender a conflict
between American and Negro judgments and strivings (emphasis added; 2009:
82).
Beyond strivings, though, there is a conflict between black and white perspectives. Like any
oppressed group or individual, African American’s experience of microaggressions cluster
around tropes and metaphors of invisibility, namelessness, and powerlessness. Those who are not
oppressed (i.e., whites, or those who can be said to “occupy personhood,”) either (1) recognize
the circumstances of the oppressed and choose to ignore it, (2) are completely unaware of the
10

circumstances, or (3) are aware of the circumstances but unsure when they actually take place or
what to do about them. One cannot help but to think of whites’ “social alexithymia,” which is,
“the inability of a great many whites to understand where African Americans and other people of
color are coming from and what their racialized experiences are like” (Feagin, 2010: 89). As Joe
Feagin points out, “[it] involves a significant lack of cross-racial empathy” (Ibid). Both black
and white presuppose whites’ underlying sense of privilege. For the oppressed, the
circumstances themselves pose a complexity of problem simply because of its conflictual nature.
For example: Not only are African Americans forced to think about how they might be viewed in
the eyes of others like most Americans do after a sense of “a self” has been constructed, but they
exhaustively think about how the event of blackness might be perceived by others as well. Sadly,
then, the idea of double consciousness has become black people’s problems, which has emerged
into an array of American societal problems. Classical writers like Ralph Ellison (1914-1994) in
his book Invisible Man, James Baldwin’s (1924-1987) Giovanni’s Room, and Frantz Fanon’s
revolutionary work (1925-1961) Black Skin, White Masks have all pointed out in their own
personal ways how they have been simultaneously influenced by and opposed to white
Americanism. In the opening passage of Invisible Man, Ellison gives a description of this
experience.
I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan
Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms. I am a man of
substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids—and I might even be said to
possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see
me. Like the bodiless heads you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though
I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they approach
me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imaginationin-deed, everything and anything except me (p. 3).
As we can see, the experiential weight of white supremacist imposition creates what Du Bois
11

might call, “a peculiar sensation” in Ellison. Denied the sublimity of Immanuel Kant’s idea of
“occupying personhood” or the normative status for participation on the stage of life, Ellison is
practically nonexistent. His experience, a racialized consciousness, speaks to a collective black
experience, “a monolithic conglomerate,” as West has once said it.
What Ellison reveals here is significant. Notice that in his language usage he signifies an
ocular metaphor⎯mirrors of a hard, distorting glass⎯that serves as a referential lens to reality
while being-in-the-world. His linguistic considerations provide a perspective that points out a
major interpretive difference when we compare and contrast it to Rene Descartes’s [cogito sum.]
Following the seventeenth century French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650), the modern
European world was turned from a stage of skepticism and thrust into a world of certainty with
his famous utterance, “Cogito ergo sum.” With this, he greatly influenced the way people came
to see and interpret reality. His conception of cogito sum simultaneously defined and ultimately
“transformed the subjectivity of doubt to certainty […] in an attempt to provide a theoretical
basis for the legitimacy of modern science” (West, 1999: 74), but more importantly, he inverted
the idea between “thinking” and the “thinking ‘of being’.”
Without considering the ways in which the non-Cartesian sum (hereafter, Ellisonian sum)
develops and operates in the oppressed, African Americans find themselves forced to interact
with reality, under a symbolic structure that reinforces and promotes psychological advantages to
whites. The impact of this unknown separation and preferential value of a worldview is what Du
Bois attempted to hash out through his central metaphor of “the Veil.” He writes:
The worlds within and without the Veil of Color are changing and changing
rapidly, but not at the same rate, not in the same way; and this must produce a
peculiar wrenching of the soul, a peculiar sense of doubt and bewilderment. Such
a double life, with double thoughts, double duties, and double social classes, must
12

give rise to double words and double ideals, and tempt the mind to pretence or to
revolt, to hypocrisy or to radicalism. (Du Bois, 2003: 143).
These changing realities have become familiar enough to African American’s lifeworld
experiences to be considered fundamentally established and naturalized. Grappling with their
sense of “double life […] double thoughts, double duties, and double social classes,” African
Americans are seduced by an ontological framing that creates dipolarized ideological empires.
As such, perspectives and the gamut of ideas are divided into two psychic spheres, two
theoretical moral worldviews, one white and one black.
Independent scholar Cynthia Schrager, in her essay “Both Sides of the Veil: Race,
Science, and Mysticism in W. E. B. Du Bois,” has pointed out these “two conflicting currents”
which Du Bois addresses. There she claims that the two domains are like a contest—“an internal
debate within the black community [...] as it were, between the so-called ‘soulless materialism’
espoused by Washington . . . and what we might call the ‘spiritual strivings’ [advocated by] Du
Bois” (Schrager, 552). Schrager suggests that Du Bois’s narrative focused more on the power of
knowledge and on the inwardly touched character of American Negroes while Washington’s
centered more on the culmination of wealth through self-help initiatives. Du Bois and
Washington, both seduced in their own particular ways by the “elitism of an Enlightenment
ethos,” undoubtedly had their flaws. Du Bois’s major shortcoming, I believe, was his naïveté of
the intrinsic motivations of white supremacy, while Washington’s civic compromise and
unwitting submission into white capitalistic society proved to be premature, if not just all out
short-sighted. The social divide as far as Schrager could see was simply a reproduction of “the
border dispute being waged in late-nineteenth-century western culture between science and
religion . . . “ (Ibid.). Following the lead of American pragmatist pioneer, William James, she
13

characterized the split as an antipathy between the “scientific-academic” and the “femininemystical” minds (emphasis added; Ibid.). As we shall see below, this idea fits well with
Gooding-Williams’s “conflictual two-ness” theoretical analysis of the concept of double
consciousness.
I find it important to note here, however, that although Du Bois did not agree with
Washington’s self-help agenda, it was not a complete dismissal of Washington’s aim as much as
it was his strategy. Du Bois knew that self-help efforts were not able to deal with the political
power of white elites. For these reasons, Du Bois was not only firm on the energies of selfassertion (like Washington), but he aimed at a way of empowering African Americans with a
weapon of self-development and self-government, which would prophetically emphasize a
theory of mind from the “inside-out” of its subjective form, rather than strictly an “outside-in”
and physical one. Washington’s strategy is simply a physicalism that blinks at rights advocacy.
It takes the predicament to be strictly a logical matter from the outside concrete world. This is
precisely why it is a notion of the double consciousness.
The rights and ideas of African American liberties were in the hands of the white elite.
Washington’s failure to see or hold secure the significance of those intrinsic qualities that Du
Bois held as fundamental for a “truer self-consciousness,” proved instead to be a loose end in his
thought and project. With this, it is commonly argued that Washington uncritically accepts, if not
all out endorses a white frame of reference for African Americans. His preoccupation with
oneness, i.e., the “outside-in”, ignores African Americans’ larger predicament of dealing with the
Cartesian cogito sum which is from the “inside-out.” Given this, Washington’s plan regrettably
falls right into the hands of white separatist practices by overlooking this smaller detail. Failing
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to realize that self-help initiatives would be seconded under Jim and Jane Crowism, Washington
inadvertently was asking black people to leave their future possibilities in the hands of nonmorally persuaded white elites. Today, the way that these discriminatory factors work during
intellectual activity has proved to be frighteningly similar. In the following section, we explore
the theory of microaggressions and I explain how.
MICROAGGRESSIONS
Microaggressions, as described by Sue…
[c]an be overt or covert but they are most damaging when they occur outside the
level of the conscious awareness of well-intentioned perpetrators. Most of us can
recognize and define overt forms of bias and discrimination and will actively
condemn such actions. However, the “invisible” manifestations are not under
conscious awareness and control, so they occur spontaneously without checks and
balances in personal, social, and work-related interactions. They can occur
among and between family members, neighbors and coworkers, and in studentteacher, healthcare provider-patient, therapist-client, and employer-employee
relationships. They are numerous, continuous, and have a detrimental impact
upon targets. Being able to define microaggressions and to know the various
forms they take must begin with a cognitive and intellectual understanding of
their manifestations and impact (emphasis added; 2010: 40).
The term “microaggressions” was first coined by Chester M. Pierce and colleagues in his work
on racism during the 1970s as the “subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges
which are ‘put downs’ of blacks by offenders” (as cited by Sue). In the decades following
Pierce’s research, there was very little attention given to the study of microaggressions and its
effects. However, works like Derald Wing Sue’s taxonomy in Microaggressions in Everyday
Life (2010), and concepts like “de cardio” racism, a term coined by John L. Jackson, Jr. in Racial
Paranoia (2008) have recently emerged. Consider two popular culture examples to help illustrate
this point.
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Twenty-two year old soccer superstar, Mario Balotelli is no stranger to racial
microaggressions. Neither is the American professional basketball player LeBron James. Both
athletes have recently been linked to and depicted as the image of King Kong within this recent
year. According to National Public Radio (hereafter, NPR) correspondent Sylvia Poggioli,
“Balotelli has faced numerous flashpoints of racist abuse both on and off the playing field” (NPR
Producer, 2012), since he gained national recognition with Manchester City and the Italy
national team. Only days before Italy’s victory over Germany in the Euro 2012 soccer
tournament held in Warsaw, soccer fans in Turin were chanting, “There's no such thing as a
black Italian” (Ibid). Some fans even greeted him by “throwing bananas and making monkey
imitations” (Ibid). As if that was not enough, La Gazzetta dello Sport, reports Poggioli, a
renowned Italian sports daily newspaper, insensitively published “a cartoon depicting Balotelli as
King Kong swatting soccer balls on top of Italy’s Clock Tower Big Ben” (Ibid). LeBron James
has had similar stirrings. On the April issue of Vogue 2008 magazine, the 6-foot-8 NBA
superstar is seen “baring his teeth, with one hand dribbling a ball and the other around 5-foot-11
Brazilian model Gisele Bundchen” (USA Today, 2008). According a columnist in the USA
Today it is an image that some magazine analyst have “likened to King Kong and Fay Wray”
(Ibid). There are a number places we can begin interpreting these happenings. I shall like to
begin with Balotelli and the racially inflammatory chant, ‘There’s no such thing as a black
Italian’
MICROASSAULTS, MICROINSULTS, MICROINVALIDATIONS
The utterance, ‘There’s no such thing as a black Italian’ perfectly describes what Sue
calls a microassault (2010). They are one of the three major forms of microaggressions presented
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in his theory. The other two are microinsults and microinvalidations. As Sue defines it,
microassaults are “the conscious, deliberate, and either subtle or explicit racial, gender, or
sexual-orientation biased attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors that are communicated to marginalized
groups through environmental cues, verbalizations, or behaviors” (2010:28). They can be best
understood as blatant, open and voluntary discriminatory acts or verbal abuse like we see in
Balotelli’s incident.
However, as we have mentioned, microaggressions are not always open or verbal. John
L. Jackson, Jr. was undoubtedly aware of this fact because in his work Racial Paranoia (2008)
he attempts to articulate and transform the previous cultural intensity, i.e., Jim and Jane Crow
race-based data of perception, and transcend it beyond blatant, specifiable forms. This is the idea
that Jackson has in mind where he writes:
We are being naïve if we think that we can sit down and intellectualize ourselves
out of its sticky clutches, if we imagine that ending explicit commitments to
blatant types of racial discrimination must mean that we are done with racism’s
awful legacy for good. It is a trap that scholars fall into as well, assuming that all
they have to do is objectively “deconstruct” race, prove it isn’t real in the
biological ways we once thought, and then imagine that by doing so they have
somehow inoculated us all against its most hazardous features, dulled its sharpest
talons. That isn’t nearly true (p. 84).
Here, Jackson points out that we cannot deconstruct race or remove explicit forms of racism and
think we are getting out of racism. In doing so, he alludes to the “ghostly character” of racism.
Thus, it follows that it is more difficult today to spot racial microaggressions because it is not
“old-fashioned” racism like we would see during the Jim and Jane Crow era. Jackson’s concept
of “de cardio” racism is racism that people of color attribute to white people’s hearts because it
cannot be directly picked out in what people are saying or doing because they are all politically
correct. In short, to be racist is no longer openly accepted because white people know that it is
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frowned upon.
One of the major shortcomings in Jackson’s theory, however, is although the ability to
have qualitative perceptions is necessary to individual well-being and survival, it may not be
sufficient to describe the nature of microaggressions in other potential and actual occasions.
What I mean to point out here is that while Jackson helps us with understanding the subtleties of
a race-based data through his concept of “de cardio” racism, if taken in isolation (as a standpoint,
and thereby postulating a whole), the theory simply takes on a fallible description which ignores
other marginalizing epiphenomena despite their actual occasions. This is certainly not to say that
what Balotelli felt is not a racial microaggression. Many would rightfully argue that it was flatout racist. My claim is that while people should be able to perceive microaggressions where
there is an explicit occurrence, they should not only be able to point out other less-explicit types
of occasions too, but more importantly (for reasons to be discussed later), not to unconsciously
transfer the proposition to other demographics. Otherwise, this in turn is also a microaggressive
reality. Microaggression as discussed here begins to take on a virtual and more illusory
character. Sue does not categorize microaggressions under these terms. However, in Section IV
of his work Microaggressions, entitled “Microaggressions in Employment, Education, and
Mental Health Practice” he does discuss and show the impact that the accretion of these
microaggressions have (2010: 209-280).
The way that we shall think about the term ‘impact’ here works best if thought of as in a
theory of intensity. Intensity, as described by Alfred N. Whitehead, “is the origination of a
conceptual feeling by the subjective aim…” (1978: 27). Thus, the subjective intensity of the
experience is also a conceptual feeling. It is best understood as a mode of perception with a
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nexus of operations and functions. Briefly, then, the subjective aim of the individual, in the
moment of an actual occasion, is also causative agent from the perceived physical world.
Therefore, when an individual achieves mastery of his or her environment through the signifying
mode of consciousness (i.e., race-based consciousness, gender-based consciousness, etc.), a
perception of its causative agencies is perceived as well. The generic contrast between the two is
based on a perceived history. An example of the concept is useful here. On May 09, 2012
President Barack Obama became the first president to publicly endorse same-sex marriage.1 The
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (hereafter, NAACP) went along
with President Obama’s bold initiative, deeming it a relevant civil rights issue. However, some
clergymen and local leaders broke away from the organization and began talking like the people
who once oppressed them. One case in point, Reverend Keith Ratliff, Sr., a long time outspoken
critic of same-sex marriage and president of the Iowa-Nebraska chapter resigned. According to
NPR analyst Cheryl Corley, Rev. Ratliff said that the “[d]eviant behavior [of homosexuals] is not
the same as being denied your right to vote because of the color of one’s skin.” In Ratliff’s own
words, “Gay community: Stop hijacking the civil rights movement” (NPR Producer, 2012).
What then is the difference between Rev. Ratliff’s analytical focus and the temperament which
informs the operations of Washington’s self-help project? Not very much I fear. A nexus of
intensities like Ratliff’s, however, is insulting to the lesbian, bisexual, gay, and transsexual
community (hereafter, LGBT community). This is exactly why it is a microinsult.
As defined by Sue, microinsults are the “interpersonal or environmental communications
1

Interestingly enough, President Barack Obama has been called the first “gay president” along
with actually being the first president of African American-decent. Yet ironically, former
President William “Bill” Clinton was named the first “black president” although he is in fact of
white heritage and decent.
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that convey stereotypes, rudeness, and insensitivity that demean a person’s racial, gender, or
sexual orientation, heritage, or identity” (2010:31). The interesting thing about microinsults is
that they typically “come with” or reveal other hidden themes, i.e., metacommunications. In an
original microaggression taxonomy proposed by Sue and Capodilupo (2008), they included the
following themes cited by (Sue, 2010: 32-39).
Table 1 is a representation of Sue and Capodilupo (2008) proposed microaggression
taxonomy. Here, included microinsults and microinvalidations show considerable overlapping.
Where in some cases we are left with little doubt as to the intent of the microaggression (i.e.,
microassaults, which are conscious and deliberate), the dividing line between microinsults and
microinvalidations usages generates confusion and fosters illusory realities. As Sue points out,
“microinsults and microinvalidations often come from a catch-22 created by double messages”
(Sue 2010:88). It is this microinsult-microinvalidation contrast which should not only help us
better understand the transmutated complexity of a Du Boisian double consciousness, but also, in
assisting us with the integration and synthesis of its conflictual two-ness.
Sue’s theory, unlike Jackson’s, highlights other relational modes of thinking (i.e., de
cardio sexism, de cardio classism, etc.). In doing this, Sue is not preoccupied with a fixed
disposition of assuring us of only racial microaggressions. This helps us in remaining mindful of
the interrelatedness of other epiphenomena potentially involved. However, Sue’s project, too,
has its shortcomings. The mere idea of separating group-specific microaggressions into their
own discriminatory parts, acting as wholes, simply demonstrates how we may unknowingly
place an invisible wedge between interpretations and our “thought-to-be” viewpoints through
theories of intersectionality (i.e., racial microaggressions, race-gender microaggressions, race-
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gender-age microaggressions). The problem is that it does not adequately capture the subjective
valuation of experience. It is more segmentally applied. As we saw in Rev. Ratliff’s case, he
gives priority to race-based epiphenomena. While we can agree with Rev. Ratliff that Black
Power Movements are clearly different in type than the Gay and Lesbian Movement—to remain
culturally insensitive to the LGBT community’s struggles not only neglects the general
consensus regarding how oppressive systems overlap and operate, it perpetuates social division.
There is a knowable subtlety here, which, if overlooked, may have devastating outcomes. This is
how microinvalidations work. Sue tells us that microinvalidations are characterized by
“communications or environmental cues that exclude, negate, or nullify the psychological
thoughts, feelings, or experiential reality of certain groups, such as people of color, women, and
LGBTs” (Sue, 2010: 37). Here, in the valuation of the language-symbolization process, Ratliff
demonstrates social division and ordering. This bias necessarily occurs when we make any
pronouncement. However, to tell other marginalized groups, to ‘stop hijacking the civil rights
movement’ clearly confuses a right for an expectation. Nothing is wrong with this, but less well
understood is how the ideological empire of whiteness retains its status as a cultural identifier.
Consider the following lexical items as a simpler illustration: “nigger” and “wigger.” Reportedly,
“wigger” is the derogatory, white equivalent of a term for “nigger.” Here it should become
glaringly obvious that blackness is the primary qualification for being a “nigger.” Whiteness, on
the other hand, retains a privileged ranking. At best, there is only the “white nigger.” Given this
example we can admit to the intersections of microaggressions, like in Sue’s methods. Our
general dispositions however lead us to believe that a concept of a process is a disagreement in
terms. As a result, this can lead to confusion. In Sue’s Microaggression Process Model (2010) he
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attempts to describe the (1) initial stages of a racial microaggression; (2) how they are perceived;
(3) the recipient’s reactions; (4) how they are interpreted; and (5) their consequences (2010: 6586).
In Sue’s (2010) Model (See also Table 2), we see the concept of a microaggression in its
completeness, i.e., from beginning to end. It constitutes the immediacy of a microaggressive
form. In other words, each of the five phases in their ‘togetherness’ establish the complex unity
of an actual occasion. It can be said, then, that the microaggressive process is the logical
relations to that which is not yet felt. It is a snap-shot picture which happens instantaneously
with no involvement of conscious awareness.
Phase one, the “incident phase,” is a situation, scenario or event experienced by the
subject. Phase two is “perception.” This domain deals with the subject’s belief as to whether or
not the incident was racially infused or motivated. Much of our focus is centered around this
domain because, as even Sue maintains, “responses vary” (2010: 68). In the next section, we
shall take a look at some participant responses from an empirical study that was conducted.
There we can see how and why responses sometimes vary among participants. Sue’s Model fails
to demonstrate adequately, that, during phenomena of the “incident phase,” there is a felt
microaggressive form which helps satisfy the interpretation of the remaining phases (i.e.,
reaction, interpretation, consequence). For example, if the incident phase is a microassault, there
should not be any questioning in the domain of perception. If there is questioning as Sue has
indicated in his description of the second phase, then, the perspective represents invalidating
microaggressions (i.e., microinvalidations) if it is unconsciously taken-for-granted, or neglected.
It is precisely this “inside-out” subjective function, in conjunction with Sue’s “outside-in”
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method that is needed in order to help expand the theory. As Sue points out, “one of the
important core ideas of the perception phase is the process of ‘Questioning’ ” (2010: 72). With
this we become conscious of an actual-potential contrast which effect the remaining phases in
different ways. This transfer of function, in the reaction phase, for instance, generates realities
like “paranoia,” “sanity checks,” struggles for “self-recognition,” and “saving face” of the
offenders (Sue, 2010: 73). As we move into phase four and five, interpretations and
consequences, of course, vary according to factors like: (1) personal experiences, (2) their
relationship to the perpetrator, (3) the racial/cultural identity development of the recipient, and
(4) the thematic content of the microaggression (Ibid.). What is accounted for in large part here
in this paper is (4) because: the actual is the concrete, tangible and finite world of the incident
itself. This is also what in fact makes it physical and real. The incident is potential, in that there
is the free play on the imagination. Therefore, it holds a conceptual and mental component as
well. Cognitive and deliberative oscillation is an aspect of intellectual activity that many of us
often take for granted. It is what oftentimes generates propositions of misconception and error.
When expressed in terms of its generic contrast during perception, it is best defined and
understood as a theory of virtuality, oscillating in the flux of between a physical pole and a
mental poles.
Sue provides a serviceable light on the operation that I am referring to with an example
from the 2008 presidential campaign (2010: 5-6). Here he demonstrates how microaggressions,
with the proper environment, can work as symbols.
[...] Republican Senator John McCain appeared at a political rally taking
questions from his supporters. One elderly White woman, speaking into a
handheld microphone, haltingly stated, “I don’t trust Obama. He’s an Arab.”
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McCain shook his head, quickly took the microphone, and said, “No ma’am.
He’s a descent family man, a citizen that I just happen to have disagreements
with.”
Sue continues,
At first glance, John McCain’s defense of the then-candidate Barack Obama
appeared admirable. After all, he was correcting misinformation and defending a
political rival.
But upon deeper reflection, Sue concludes that,
[...] his response [McCain], while well-intentioned, represented a major
microaggression.
What I am taking Sue to mean here by “major microaggression” is the potency of the
microaggression in relation to the subtleness and intensity of other potential microaggression
forms. In this case, the microaggressive form is at a very high level of abstraction not because of
its conceptual-value, but because of the level of generality it is grounded on in relation to other
microaggressive criteria for detection. “Major microaggression” therefore means “at,” “in” or
“of” the highest intensity of abstraction for which a microaggression can possibly be detected,
which is its level of subtleness. This appears to be a slippery slope because the “highest level,”
as many might argue, is, perhaps, what is explicit, blatant and deliberate, i.e., microassaults. But
as we all know, language is biased, and then again, promiscuous. Besides the brute fact of ‘the
woman seeing something inherently bad or wrong with being an Arab,’ other underlying themes
can remain hidden, and often do. As Sue goes on to point out,
Equating mistrust with a person’s nationality or religion, especially being Muslim
or of Middle Eastern heritage, has resurged in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
What we have witnessed here are the categoreal demands and imagery of an ingression of the
symbolic reference “terrorism” into the Middle Easterners and Muslim community at a

24

microlevel. It is extremely subtle, but it is precisely why it is a microinvalidation. However,
notice the triviality of the idea. The microaggression is also a microinsult because it is utterly
insulting as well. Thus, where historical events like 9/11 can work to produce preconceived
meanings and fixed to dispositions with as much regularity in their complexity as to objectify
present and future possibilities, (not only with those same concepts, but also similar conceptual
feelings as the initial phase), these value-laden symbols then can be rightly identified as
microinvalidations that not only “creep in” undetected as functional substitutes of the reality
experienced; but they are fill-ins, mixed “hybrid feelings” (Whitehead, 1972), i.e., propositions,
for the thought of those experiences as a “perspective of perspectives” as thought to be felt by
the subject and by others. In the concluding section, I discuss these propositions as they apply to
a popular culture example involving Mario Balotelli and LeBron James. However, in this next
section, we explore the responses and analysis of an empirical study conducted to help highlight
some microaggressive forms when they actually occur. Thus, the purpose aim for in this project
is to answer the question of what is the capacity for the realization of a microaggression? This
question was answered by interviewing students throughout the insular South on their
experiences with microaggressions. Interviewee responses were coded and analyzed using Sue’s
taxonomy of microaggressive forms.
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CHAPTER III
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MICROAGGRESSION FORMS

METHODOLOGY
Ten people were asked to participate in an interview across southern campuses and
communities. Of those who were approached for interviews, four expressed concerns about
being voice recorded. The resulting six participants were included for analysis: Nicholas, a 21year-old African American male from Tennessee; Vaughn, a 22-year-old African American male
who grew up in Mississippi; Ashley, a 23-year-old African American female who works at a
local restaurant near a southern university; Kalvin, a 26-year-old African American male student;
Ricci, a 25-year-old graduate student and library employee; and Victor, a 29-year-old African
American male who works as an attorney in a local law firm.
All participants included in the analysis consented to participating prior to starting the
interview. Interviews occurred at convenient locations surrounding local universities, namely
outside of libraries, student centers, lunchrooms, bus stops, etc. All interviews were conducted
during the day, and took no longer than 15 minutes to complete. Interviewees were selected
using a convenience sample.
Each interview followed a similar structure. Verbal consent was obtained prior to starting a
voice recorder. After starting the recorder, participants were asked the following questions:
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1.
2.
3.

Do you believe that racial discrimination is still going on today? If so, how?
Have you had any personal experiences with racial discrimination?
Do you recall any instances where you believed you were being discriminated against
but you were not quite sure? If so, when or how?

Each question was read to the interviewee one at a time for clarity and understanding.
Interviewees were given ample time to answer each question before moving on to the next
question. The interviewer provided verbal cues (i.e., “how so”, “what do you mean by that?”)
only to help provide clarity to the interviewee’s response.
The interview concluded after participants had responded to all questions. They were
thanked for their time before being debriefed and excused from the study. Voice recordings
were transcribed, then, excerpts were selected as examples for analysis and discussion.
CRITERIA FOR DATA AND CODING PROCEDURE
After all interviews took place, interviewee responses were categorized and analyzed
across types of microaggressions: a) microassaults, b) microinsults, or c) microinvalidations.
Responses were categorized as follows:
Microassaults: blatant, with high intensity for detection
Microassaults carry a high intensity of detection because they are typically purposeful,
conscious and deliberate acts of discrimination against other marginalized groups. Interviewee
responses were included in this category if when they fit he description of de jure racism seen in
Jim and Jane Crow era.
Microinsults: subtle, with a moderate intensity for detection
Like microinvalidations, microinsults are also subtle. However, microinsults are
generally slants or slights directed towards the self-esteem, for example, the discriminatory27

based language in “separate but equal” and “don’t ask, don’t tell” policies. Microinsults are more
detectable than microinvalidations, but not as detectable as microassaults. Interviewee responses
were included in this category based on the microaggression’s complexity to causing confusing
or pause in the respondent.
Microinvalidiations: very subtle, with an extremely low intensity for detection
Although microinvalidations have a low intensity for detection, they potentially cause the
most harm because oftentimes they are ignored or neglected. This is, in fact, what constitutes it
as a microinvalidation. They directly dismiss, deny, or negatively prehend the events and reality.
More destruction is possible here because of microinvalidations extremely subtle detection. It
bespeak to an invisible and seemingly nonexistent, and ghostly character, like the Ellisonian sum
(see introduction). Interviewee responses were included in this category based off its theme and
predilection for colorblindness.
DATA ANALYSIS
Nicholas, a 21-year-old undergraduate retells a story of an incident in a public restroom
at a local bar near a southern university:
I was peeing in the bathroom and this dude came stumbling through the door, like
sloppy drunk. He saw me and said, “Oh, my bad,” cause it was kinda a small
bathroom. It only had a toilet and a urinal. His boy came in right behind him and
bumped into him [.] and he said [the friend], “What’s going on?” Then the other
dude said, “Nothing [.] but a nigger is in here using the toilet.” I got so mad…
There is nothing very unconscious or subtle about this incident, which is precisely why Sue
would categorizes it as a microassault. It is a clear attack aimed at Nicholas’s race. Nicholas, in
stating that, “[he] got so mad,” indicates that he detected it as such. What is of particular interest
here though is the social bond that is broken as an effect. Given the comment, “[…] a nigger is in
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here using the toilet,” the “drunk dude” makes a clear distinction between him and Nicholas.
Because racial domination defines the relationship between Nicholas and the “drunk dude” in
white and black terms (no pun intended), it is not hard to see how an accretion of value involving
race-based phenomenology gains efficacy through common day-to-day aesthetics. Sue predicts
this much in his outside-in style of methodology. The style as a methodology however is
excessively objective. The logical entailment of this approach is to help us locate a cultural and
epochal schism from the physical outside world. As seen in Nicholas and the “drunk dude’s”
case, it is in the form of a relic from the old Jim and Jane Crow era. It represents the relationship
and symbolism of master-slave dialect. Thus, not only is Nicholas immediately reduced to a
brute and second-class citizen by this subtle form of racial inheritance, but he is sociohistorically
posited into another space and time period. If this idea is unwittingly neglected or not prehended
as a real possibility to Nicholas, a microinvalidation arises because although the concept of
different space-time traveling is knowable, it is oftentimes fallibly interpreted, rather than
explicitly understood of as a real potential and actual entity of reality. This in turn can generate a
seconded reality, i.e., a transmutated sense of Du Boisian double consciousness.
Vaughn, a 22-year-old undergraduate from Mississippi shares with us a similar
experience he had one Sunday after a church service:
We had just gotten back from church. I must have been about 9 or 10 [.] these
white people where flying [read: speeding] by the house and I heard somebody
say, [participant whispering] “You fucking niggers!” I couldn’t really tell what
exactly they said exactly, but I know they said “nigger” cause I asked my mom
what it meant [.] and she asked me where I had heard it from.
Here, we have another example of a microassault. Aforementioned, racial microassaults are
simply “old-fashion” forms of Jim and Jane Crow racism that can produce secondary realities.
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Here, again, it is an attack on race, Vaughn’s race. Although, it is not likely that Vaughn had
thought himself in any definitive terms as a brute, a slave, or a second-class citizen given his
tender age, he has been most certainly qualified as one by “the Other,” i.e., white people. With
this, Vaughn has been transformed into a “subhuman” species, and seconded by social
convention and cultural practices, as Sue theorizes. Yet, Vaughn is too young to understand that
mentally he is able to remain free from such conventions, and that linguistic structures are merely
compartmentalizations that can imprison him if they are unwittingly taken wholesale as some
truth. Sadly then, Vaughn, as with most children, has the dreadful misfortune and dilemma of
negatively prehending microinvalidations, until some conversion-like experience helps in the
transformation of his perceptual interpretation. This is partly because, as children, we do not
quickly discover the true essence and value of ourselves until the conflictual two-ness schism is
eliminable from our thinking. This is a distinction between fact and form. Failing to intellectually
grasp the limits of a race-based identity through as inside-out style methodology is a necessary
feat unless the individual is to remain mentally assimilated to the physical world of form, as a
“subhuman,” “a child” or “second-class citizen” by conventional sociohistorico-cultural
practices. This “outside-in”-“inside-out,” is simply another generic contrast of a transmutated
form of Du Boisian double consciousness. As a form of rethinking, Vaughn must contact this
inside-out perspective as a way to counter-balance the outside-in perspective. Otherwise, there a
virtuality begins to emerge around other conceptual possibilities.
Ashley, a 23-year-old undergraduate retells her experience as a hostess in a restaurant:
… when I was helping Tiffany [a co-worker and waitress] this one table was
really rude to me. They said they needed to-go boxes. So I grabbed them some.
But after I gave them the boxes, the kids were laughing every time I passed by the
table. I thought they were laughing at me so I went to the restroom to check to
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see if I had anything on my face. I didn’t see anything so the next time I went by
the table and the kids were laughing—I asked them [the family of four] if they
needed anything else. They [parents of the children] shook their heads but one of
the kids said [while giggling], “Yea, my dad said could you box up the lemons,
too.” They started laughing, but you could tell that the dad was embarrassed. I
don’t think he was expecting his son to say that [.] I told him, I was offended and
that I thought he was rude. When I told Tiffany and she said she didn’t think they
were racist [.] She knew them she said [.] they aren’t racist—they just come from
money and think they’re better than everybody else. She saw it as a class thing.
Me and Tiffany still cool but I don’t think that was just a class thing. To me it
was racist.
For Ashley, it remains clear that she saw the incident as a “racist moment.” In fact, she reports
“feeling it” first, thinking that she was being “laughed at.” Sue misses this moment of
microaggression “as feeling.” Many might suggest that Ashley might have thought the customer
was racist because she is of African-descent and the customer is white. These images can and
frequently do contribute to such an extent. Sue expresses this idea and concept explicitly in his
work as aesthetic intensities from the physical world. The doctrine in which I am interested in
teasing out here is much subtler (like how Ashley’s perception is immediately relegated to
simply “race talk”). As Ashley points out, “Tiffany knew them” . . . [and that Tiffany claims it
was] “just a class thing.” Of course it is possible to think one interpretation is more befitting to
the scenario than the other, but to ignore interpretations is to be culturally insensitive to other’s
lived realities while being-in-the-world. Ashley thinks the people are racist and that the people
are laughing at her. This is predicated on her experience of them as rude. She may have been
predisposed to expect that white customers are rude to her as a black server. Tiffany could have
been apologizing for them because she knew them, she could have said it was class-based
because it makes her and Ashley (both servers) equal, as if to say, they may have treated her like
that, too. Here, Ashley is experiencing racial paranoia because she thinks it is about race, but she
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can not know with empirical certainty, other than her gut feeling, i.e., “de cardio” racism, that
they are being racist, just being rude in general (with no particular motivation), or being classist.
Yet, where we witness Tiffany’s exclamation of their innocence of racism, we can also see how
Ashley has experienced another, subtler microaggressive form. If we emphasize the response
“they aren’t racist,” Tiffany explicitly denies Ashley’s racial reality. If Tiffany is not just simply
“pathologizing Ashley’s cultural values and communication styles,” (Sue, 2010) Tiffany’s
reluctance to fully acknowledge or see how Ashley’s experience is real, bespeaks a sense of
racial colorblindness (Sue, 2010). Although extremely subtle, Ashley has also experienced a
microinvalidation (one which she may not have detected). With feeling insulted, Ashley is the
direct target of a racial microinsult. But we cannot know for sure that she detects the
microinvalidation transmitted from Tiffany, her friend and coworker. Ashley simply dismisses
it, by saying “me and Tiffany still cool but I don’t think that was just a class thing.” In this case,
the microaggression is negatively prehended or nullified on pretenses of friendship and worker
association. Here we can see that microaggressions most certainly go undetected, but they
remain detectable. Given this, we see another illustration of a microinsult-microinvalidation
contrast, specifically because Ashley detects one microaggression but dismisses the other. This
generic contrast that can not only generate a structure of conflictual two-ness whose general
principle perpetuates a distorted reality during the inflow of datum between physical and mental
poles, but it can most certainly perpetuates a transmutated sense of Du Boisian double
consciousness as well, i.e., a distorted reality.
Kalvin, a 26-year-old graduate student had a similar experience to Ashley. Below,
Kalvin explains how when he was at home with his roommates one evening while watching the
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Summer Olympics, the following happened:
Yea, this one time when me and my roommates were watching the Olympics. The
women were getting ready to race and Steven asked me and Michael, “What
country are the colors green, black, and yellow?” I said “I don’t know, but maybe
Jamaica.” There was a pause. Then Michael said, “But she’s white!” I was
confused for a second. But I kinda started to smile to myself, because I never
really thought of Michael as racist. So I yelled back, so what are you saying,
“That there are only black people in Jamaica?” We all ended up laughing about it
(emphasis added).
This example fits particular well with Sue’s category of microinsults because it contains an
unconscious message of “abnormality” and a theme of “second class citizenry.” The comment,
“but she’s white” is an utterance that Kalvin found perplexingly insulting. He did not know
whether to he should feel insulted or not. Michael’s assumption that the woman was not from
Jamaica because she was “white” contains a metamessage that left Kalvin dazed and confused,
but aware of the microaggression in general but not necessarily in terms of any definitive
intensity. This confusion undoubtedly is generated by a disruption, or something conflitual in
Kalvin’s way of thinking that reflects a division, and an oscillation between reality and nonreality. There would be no reason for anyone to doubt the existence of “white Africans” too
under Michael’s logic. For Michael, then, the idea of blackness is an event that is situated in
Jamaica. Sue most certainly would agree with this much because the conflation of Michael’s
functional logic is something that he discovered from his own experiences in culture, i.e., the
physical world (which is an outside-in style of methodology). But if the transitive character of
Michael’s immediate deduction is adequately preserved as a worldview, i.e., white racial frame
(as an inside-out rather in tandem with an outside-in style)⎯what ideas, events or concepts might
have found their location in terms like “American,” “Iranian,” or “African?” Given this, a subtle
ingression of a vaguely postulated unit of logical measure constitutes a microaggressive reality
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that Sue’s theoretical orientation dimly captures, which is precisely why it is a microinvalidation.
We cannot safely conclude that Kalvin readily detects how the white racial frame has shaped his
own logic. Although Kalvin experiences a microaggressive reality, the trigger by which he
receives the feeling dictates the intensity and the potential destructiveness of its form. For
instance, on the one hand, there is a connection between what Michael said and what Kalvin felt.
On the other hand, there is the disharmony between what was said and how it made Kalvin feel.
This is a significant point to remember because it highlights a distinction between what is
cultural fact in one case and subjective form in another. With this, we inevitably contact an
aesthetic/moral contrast. This is a point that I shall return to in the concluding section.
Ricci, a 25-year-old graduate student and librarian employee had this to say about one of
her experiences with racial discrimination.
We were in line talking, and this, there was this older white lady maybe 40 early
50s. She walks up in front of us [.] she walks up and she doesn’t look at us
directly, but I know she can see us [.] and she gets in front of us, stops for a few
seconds and her other friend comes up and they started having a conversation. I’m
checking this out while I’m talking to my friend, and my friend didn’t even pay it
any mind. Then the lady continued to talk. Well, as I saw the line move I tried
stepping around her, without bumping her and we ended up almost hitting each
other. She looks at me and says “No, no what are you doing!” I said: “Hey, we
were in line before you.” She looks over at her friend, I guess for some type of
support. Her friend look back at her and I said we were here a least 2 maybe 3
minutes before you. They think just because we’re African Americans that we
still got to put up with that shit. I said to my friend, “did you see that?” She said,
“Yea, but I wouldn’t have said anything, I would have just let them pass.”
African Americans have often described their experience of invisibility as being “ignored,”
“devalued,” “insignificant,” “less than” or “unworthy of being recognized” (Sue, 2010).
According to Sue’s account, this is a clear ascription to microinsults because of its concomitant
theme of “second-class citizenry.” But this is not all. Being treated as a second-class citizen can
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also evoke feelings of “alienation” and “objectification.” Given this, it is a microinvalidation that
may or may not be detected or felt. What is also of interest here is Ricci’s girlfriend’s response.
Although, Ricci initially thought her friend “didn’t [see the woman],” we find out later in the
passage that, admittedly, she did and ignored it. Ricci’s reaction can also be interpreted as a
“racial paranoia” rather than simply a healthy skepticism or suspicion; and her friend’s reaction,
as a form of compliance or an “Aunt Jane” rather than something that was simply dismissed as
insignificant. Given this, it can be rightly said that race has no meaning apart from its aesthetic
and subjective intensity.
Victor, a 29-year-old attorney, with whom I spoke with outside of a southern university
library, retells the following story.
I got up one morning around nine o’clock—nine thirty on Saturday morning to
run when I realized I had left my sneakers at my parent’s house that was miles
away. Instead of going there to get them, I decided to drive to Hibbett’s to get a
new pair. When I got there, I park in front of another car in the parking lot. When
I looked up to my left, I saw a lady in a car just diagonal to me. She was on her
cell phone. When I got out of the car, I locked my door—and when I was
walking past the lady in the car, I saw her frantically begin to tussle around for
something near her car door window—when I then heard her car door lock. Then
I realized that she had locked her doors because she saw me coming. I just
laughed and kept walking—because stuff like that doesn’t even surprise me
anymore.
Victor’s experience highlights something very interesting about the workings of the
microaggressions and the Cartesian sum. When Victor got out of his car to go into the shoe
store, the woman who saw him was invoked with panic, and as a result, “she locked her doors.”
One way to look at the lady’s actions after seeing Victor are through values that could best be
explained and attributed to gender-based ideologies, in terms of the stereotypes and taboos
surrounding black sexuality. Maybe she felt as if she was vulnerable to being raped, or robbed.
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This point is undoubtedly hard to tease out, but there is something interesting here about the
intersections of race, gender, and age. Would she have locked her doors for an older, betterdressed black man? Or would she have done so as frantically? We cannot claim to know. I do
not see how anyone truly could. This example fits well into the category of a microinsult
because of its themes of “criminality” and “sexual objectification” (Sue, 2010: 36). But it fits
into Sue’s category of microinvalidation too because,⎯where we see intersections of race,
gender, and age⎯we oftentimes neglect that we make assumptions on some achieved change in
the accretion of value in each of the group-specified microaggressions for our acting judgment
(See Ratliff, p. 19-21). Victor has clearly detected it as such, because, as he states in his response
above, “I just laughed and kept walking… stuff like that doesn’t even surprise me anymore.”
Where we see “stuff like” white people’s behavior as “no surprise” (to quote Victor), we also
bear witness to the dimissal of a feeling and intensity. Sue does make this point explicit in his
theory. I find it important to say that this is certainly not to say that Sue’s scholarship is not
significant, or that his contributions are not widely appreciated. This is largely not the case. Yet,
it remains clear that Victor is well aware of the countless number of times in which
microaggressions actually occur in his life. With this, Victor (even if only momentarily), decides
to ignore or neglect the ensuing conceptual feeling of unity with the intensity felt. This is an
important point to remember because although there can be no elimination of the conceptual
feeling in general, Victor can cognitively manage the relative significance of its form. And, of
course this ignores all of the contextual ingredients of the outside world.
An accumulation of microinvalidations is an integral determining factor of the
intensiveness and impact of a microaggressive form. The “valuing up” or “valuing down” of his

36

feelings in an actual occasion is also causally linked to the objects of these feelings, i.e., white
people’s behavior. Otherwise, there is no microaggressive form to be found. But as we have
earlier concluded, it is not a question of detecting the microaggression, but one of intensity. But
yet, when dealing with the intensities of microaggressive forms like microinsults and
microinvalidations, it not only becomes difficult to epistemologically categorize the nature of
their character (as Sue has attempted), but it is equally important to remember that the character
is subjectively ascribed by a personal order. With the emergence of a microinsultmicroinvalidation contrast arises a division between subjective feelings. Sue attempts to clear
away some of the confusion through his conceptualization of microaggressive themes. However,
as demonstrated in the vignettes above, even those themes have been shown to overlap into more
than one microaggressive form and feeling, as undetected, but certainly not undetectable. Here,
in Victor’s case, we see the adverb of his experience, for he decides to deal with “stuff like” the
relentless continuation of white people’s behavior as something “unsurprising,” but knowable.
This is undoubtedly is a form of resistance. With this, he has privately, if not consciously
minimized the level of adjectival frequency with which the intensities are conflictually
contrasted.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Of the many minorities who may adopt American values, their experiences, with
overwhelming regularity, evoke and implicitly validate both a racial and sexist contract, which
relegates their cultural distinctiveness as meaningless and undesirable. Indeed, it is true that Du
Bois often contrasted the dipolarized ideological frames through his central metaphor of “the
Veil.” However, despite this criticism, Du Bois ultimately sought to resolve the “warring ideals”
between the two sterner logics. Any naysayers refuting this end are unquestionably doing a
gross misreading of his oeuvre and a misrepresentation of what he really meant. This, too, can
be a microinvalidation because many individuals often neglect, overlook or unwittingly dismiss
the “predominance of the Enlightenment ethos” which largely influenced thinking in general
during that time. For example, if we look through a yearbook, we can generally make accurate
judgments on what time periods particular images were intensified (e.g., the 1960s, 1970s, etc.)
contingent upon the clothes people are wearing, hairstyles, eyewear, and through relevant
imaging in the backgrounds. During the time of the photo however, these realties and its
concomitant of influences were considerably less evident to us, and to the people in them,
although the ideas themselves were omnipresent. When we reify these ideas, intensifying them
and, carrying them out⎯they become just as real as they were during the actual occasion (but in
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the Cartesian product of another vaguely postulated unit of temporal activity as an actual
occasion).
Although subtle, we are greatly influenced by the conflictual two-ness schism of this
particular technological historical epoch too. As we have seen in some of the examples above,
the microinsult-microinvalidation contrast can generate distorted realities. By dealing with the
physical side of an actual occasion, i.e., culture⎯through mediums like the media, mascots,
books, architecture, sound⎯one’s preference for specific content is not only shaped to be viewed
a certain way, but it is interpretable under a specified Cartesian lens. When content of the
physical world does not reflect its conceptual pole, a demarcation is produced between the two
poles. This reality is accounted for by the various levels, generalities, intensities and “levels of
generalities and intensities” by which microinvalidations occur.
According to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (2010), America has the
largest prison population per capita (Patterson, 2011: 138). Of those incarcerated, African
Americans and Hispanic Americans, statistically speaking, far exceed the likelihood of Asian or
White Americans in being incarcerated. If this were not shocking enough, the U.S. Department
of Education has even shown that in the last two decades, “racial and ethnic segregation in
America’s public schools has increased” when compared to the 1950s and 60s (Ibid., 155). Yet,
racial progress is undeniable. But with propositions such as these, it is not hard to see how a
predicative pattern of perceptual conceptual feelings would not reflect what Derrick Bell has
called a “flexible amnesia” for the collective black community (2004: 5). Even as Michelle
Alexander has exclaimed in her book The New Jim Crow, “the symbolic production of race is
partly held together by the power to define the meaning and significance of race in its time”

39

(2012: 196). To be brief, Alexander shows that every racial caste system in the United
States⎯from slavery to Jim and Jane Crow, to Jim and Jane Crow to this current era of mass
incarceration⎯there has been produced some type of racial stigma” (Ibid). To be “black” during
the era of slavery, exclaims Alexander, “was to be a slave;” to be “black” during Jim and Jane
Crow it was “to be a second-class citizen;” and today in this era of mass incarceration it is “to be
a criminal” (Ibid). Because concepts like “slave,” “second-class citizenry” and “criminal” are
conflated with what it means to be black in America from the “outside-in,” through aesthetically
maintained social conventions, political agendas and media elites, it tells us very little in regards
to how we can resist microaggressive effects despite their enigmatic nature. This is a broad
outline of what Sue’s outside-in style of methodology demonstrates for us. In this last section,
however, I use a popular culture example to help illustrate the inside-out style of methodology.
CONCLUSION
Since thinking can be a substitute for action, it follows that an image can be a proposition
for a conceptual feeling (Whitehead, 1978:184-207). The proposition, to be presented here is
like “cheese on a cracker,” it is “a lure for feeling” (Ibid.). Images, unlike words, are a datum of
objectifications with an indefinite number of interpretations. Images refer to both temporal and
non-temporal entities. Given both LeBron James and Mario Balotelli’s recent King Kong
depictions, with all their determinant racial and ethnic inheritances, and the long legacy of
slavery in American, conceptual reproductions of African Americans being depicted as
“monkeys” undoubtedly affirms a racial microaggression. The King Kong image is a proposition
of perpetuating racial stereotypes. It is a stigma that constitutes the physical pole of the
experience. Within its presentational immediacy, is the conceptual pole as well. During an
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actual occasion of an experience, the subject prehends conceptual data, receiving it within a
physical feeling. Given each actual occasion of the experience, the free play of the imagination
receives data from the physical world, with all its subjectively inherited memories, acquired
habits and cultural tastes. Clearly, then, the media is a culture and seasoned medium for the
accretion of microaggressive valuations. For instance, not very long ago, a friend informed me,
that there was a black couple featured in a K-Y Jelly commercial. In depicting a mode of
ingression, i.e., a perspective⎯one of the things that happens (in addition to sparks and
fireworks), is that a watermelon bursts. “It was very quick,” she said, “but it was clearly a
bursting watermelon.” Whether intentionally or not, the commercial is linking people of color
“sexual pleasures” with watermelons, or what in some cases have been referred to as “nigger
apples” during the Jim and Jane Crow era. Therefore, an ingression of some kind of primitive,
“porch monkey,” “watermelon sexuality,” has found its way into the event blackness as an
ingredient in African American’s lives. This is a racial microaggression. A lot of her friends
reportedly saw it and thought so too. Yet, K-Y Jelly could very easily say they did not intend for
it to be racist. The doctrine here maintained is a theory of intensity revealed in the proposition
entertained by the prehending subject. What then is the character assigned to the datum
presented if it is not “the Other?”
Now, returning to our previous popular culture example: According to a newspaper
column in the USA Today, James told The (Cleveland) Plain Dealer he was pleased with the new
Vogue cover, saying he was “just showing a little emotion” (Jones, 2008). He told columnists:
“Who cares what anyone says?” (Ibid). Mario Balotelli, on the other hand, was outraged.
Although, the King Kong depiction is undoubtedly a racial microaggression, the ways James and
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Balotelli grasp the data reveals something very significant. Because these responses are
different, we see an actual occasion where a racial microaggression is given two different
interpretations, i.e., microinsult-microinvalidation contrast. Here we see that the image is not
only different in interpretation, but more importantly, it shows a difference in subjective feeling.
This, then, reveals an intensity, i.e., microaggressive form⎯one that comparatively is not within
“the Other.” Sue’s Model misses this datum of conscious experience. As previously mentioned,
the Model is ‘merely’ a snapshot of a microaggression in its immediacy. To judge it otherwise is
an act of logic than of thinking. In other words, it is a distinction between fact and form. Datum
“received” as experience, is initially indeterminant. But as we can clearly see with James and
Balotelli, history has its own personal order. Kenneth Burke put it best where he writes:
[…] historians for the most part are relativistic. But where one considers
different historical characters from the standpoint of the total development, one
could encourage each character to comment upon the other without thereby
sacrificing a perspective upon the lot. This could be got particularly, I think, if
historical characters themselves (i.e., periods or cultures treated as “individual
persons”) were considered never to begin or end, but rather to change in intensity
of poignancy (emphasis included; 1989:256).
Given this Jamesian and Balotellian imagery of the microinsult-microinvalidation contrast, self is
the personal order of occasions that have been serially threaded together throughout the passage
of time. The images themselves refurbish the intensity of a substantive metaphysics in its literary
experience that regenerates logical subjects into some type of vaguely postulated “WashingtonDu Bois imagery.” This fracturing perpetuates a dialectical relation in perception as well as in
thinking. However, if we take away the color scheme for a moment, to clear away some of the
ambiguity of a microinvalidating reality, we notice that this type of dichotomized perception
does not simply belong to African Americans experiences. Rather, the point is that the
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microaggression works idiosyncratically across various demographics. The intensity here
revealed is based on the individual subject and not a determinant categorical scheme of what is
and is not perceived in a more unifying and encompassing scheme of reality. It is simply one of a
multiplicity of particulars contrasted in a personal order of perception, namely, in propositions
that were highlighted in order for it to be uniformly or systematically indicated as such. The
predicate (i.e., race-based, gender-based, sexual-orientation based, disability-based, class-based,
etc.) personally ascribed to the subjective form is part of the intensity that invariably ends up
qualifying the character of the microaggression. As we have saw in the vignettes, no incident
was definitively determinable as a specific microaggression form. It is simply a balanced
measure of “valuing up” or “valuing down” the complex form of the personal order by the
prehending subject. When viewing these entities separately, it is not hard to see that one either
sees the perils of racism as alive and well or as dated and obsolete. Double consciousness, first
and foremost, is a racialized consciousness. Today, in its transmutated form, it does not simply
belong to the oppressed, but after years of civil unrest and struggles, it is now observable in the
oppressors as a white racial frame. Feagin was undoubtedly understood this point because he
coined the idea and theorized the concept in a way that reinterpreted Du Bois’s idea from an
“outside-in” style methodology. The reader has more than likely heard some white Americans
insisting on their experiences with reverse discrimination. Thus, we live in a time where the
oppressor feeling is that he or she denies responsibility or guilt for the dark, bloody horrors of
American slavery. Yet, this does not say much about the effects of their unjust enrichment. And
the disinherited, it has been often said that they claim a victimology for their lowly conditions.
Upon higher levels of consciousness, i.e., persons who rightly prefer of a moral order over and
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against the predominance of an excessively aesthetic one, may notice that the oppressor’s burden
of “[white] guilt,” and the oppressed’s “racial paranoia” are actually two different sides to the
same coin. Given these academic euphemisms, we notice that “guilt” is easier to dismiss than
“paranoia,” especially given the psychological wages afforded to white Americans in our current
society. What is even more troubling is that double consciousness is considered a consciousness
“of the oppressed,” and the “white racial frame,” describes consciousness in white Americans. If
we do not insist on illuminating and eliminating the various modes of conflation-ingression
contrast that spawn these very dangerous microinvalidating realities, we are failing to efficiently
eliminate the reproduction of oppressive systems. Many of these microinvalidations, in large
part, have to do with the underrepresentation of marginalized groups’ perspectives in essential
areas like education.
FURTHER STUDIES
As I have attempted to demonstrate, and as many of us all know, the issue of
consciousness is sticky. However, I find it important to remind us that the process that I
conjectured above with Jamesian and Balotelli imagery is not consciousness, but rather a
conscious snapshot that helps point to an event or what happened from the subject’s adjectival
perspective. It does create a consciousness. Sue and I both agree on this. But because human
beings are conscious, and they do in fact engage in the act of reflection, they will begin to notice
microinvalidations more through the inside-out style that I am suggesting. It is a reflection and at
the same time, it provides an ability to reflect. The question then is: What do you do with the
consciousness that it creates? No one helps illustrate this important point of the two styles
‘together’ in its subjective harmony better than abolitionist and reformer Frederick Douglass
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(1818-1895). In his autobiography My Bondage and My Freedom (1855), Douglass sets up an
instructive analogy for our concluding thoughts with his recollections of life on the slave
plantation. There, Douglass tells us how personal relationships between the slave and his
overseer in the era of slavery have served the aim of an oppressive system. In Douglass’s view,
one was either a slave to the slavemaster or to the slavemaster’s proxy. This undoubtedly is an
absolutist worldview. However, Douglass tells us about a fight with the slavebreaker, Covey.
After Douglass successfully defends himself in the fight, he is transformed (from a brute to a
person). As Douglass retells it, “I was a changed being after that fight” (1987: 151). Here,
Douglass not only claims his independence and freedom, but he also reveals to us a new form of
resistance. Douglass no longer felt subject to another’s will, for he had discovered in the
conflict, a limit to the slavemaster’s domination. Douglass had contacted mental freedom. With
this, Douglass begins to radically reconstruct his thinking. Douglass certainly understood that he
was bound by fact to slavery, but in form he was not. Free of the charges of Du Boisian double
consciousness and the seemingly sycophancy of Washington’s unwitty submission, Douglass’s
account serves both extrinsic and intrinsic ends. We see the prisoner move from a prison to, one
of what the prisoner sees in a very subtle manner and intensity. This subtly, or what I have come
to understand as a microinvalidation, gives way to considerations of beauty that it does not give
to moral law. An aesthetic order is just simply Nazi, Germany all over again. Moral order,
however, is binding on all persons at all times. More importantly, moral ends derive from
feeling.
In sum, a traditional education is an absolutist geometric structure adjusted for, but
indifferent to, acts of justice by Douglass’s account. Like Sue’s methodological style, traditional
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education is viewed by cultural fact, adjustable by an aesthetic order, and comprised of
impersonal surface categories of race, gender, sexual orientation, etc. This inevitably takes
precedence over a person’s talents and abilities. It was not until Douglass defended himself
against Covey that algebraic structures of a moral order begin to emerge (just like how and what
we come into contact with in the Jamesian and Balotelli conjecture). After the conflictual twoness, Douglass was not only able to reflect after his fight, he was able to redefine persons and
limit the oppressor’s form of domination.
In an oppressive society, the true slave education⎯i.e., the wretched and the disinherited
of the earth⎯comes from the “inside-out.” Given this, we penetrate the surface of reality, to the
beyond, into the sublimity and depth of our humanity and personhood because, as Douglass
shows us: Education is a process. It is a process of unlearning and relearning. But for the
oppressed, we must remember it is also a process of relearning and unlearning.
If consciousness is cyclical (which I am arguing that it is), we can get readers to contact
feeling and reflect on what happened. Through an “inside-out” style methodology, may be a
useful exercise to consider in psychotherapeutic models. That way, we get people to start
contacting the microaggressive moment as feeling, and thus⎯ to become more aware of what
they feel at that moment and why. When people reflect, they focus on other things like inquiry,
difficult dialogues, memory and signification and meaning. With this, we can generate a radical
reconstructionist view that can help others resuscitate the suffocation of their own identities and,
to focus on different response classes of the sociological imagination in a technologically-driven
society.
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Table 1: Microaggression theme adopted from Sue and Capodilupo (2008)
Microaggressive Theme
Use of Sexist/Heterosexual
Language

Definition
Microinvalidation which highlights term that exclude, ignore,
deny, negate, neglect, invalidate or degrade women and
LGBT individuals.

Closely related to the theme of colorblindness, this
Denial of Individual
microinvalidation is a form of abnegation which involves an
Racism/Sexism/Heterosexism individual’s denial of personal association with racism,
sexism, and heterosexism
Myth of Meritocracy

This theme asserts that race, gender, and sexual orientation
are not seen as inhibitors to one’s life world chances or
successes.

Pathologizing Cultural
Values/Communication
Styles

This microinsult works under the belief that cultural styles of
White, male, and straight groups are normative and that
people of color, females, and LGBT individuals are somehow
abnormal. It sends metamessages to assimilate and
acculturate, while devaluing other cultural values.

Second-Class Citizen

Second-class citizenry is a microinsult that contains an
unconscious message that certain groups are less worthy, less
important, less deserving, and are inferior being that they
deserve discriminatory treatment.

Traditional Gender Role
Prejudicing and Stereotyping

Sexual Objectification

Assumption of Abnormality

This occurs when expectations of traditional roles or
stereotypes are conveyed.
Sexual objectification is the process by which women are
transformed into “objects” or property at the sexual disposal
or benefit of men.
This theme is related to the perception that something about a
person’s race, gender, sexual orientation is abnormal, deviant,
and pathological.
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APPENDIX B: MICROAGRESSION PROCESS MODEL

53

Table 2: The Microaggression Process Model as proposed by Sue (2010)
Domain

Explanation

Phase 1: Incident

An event or situation
experienced by the
participant

Phase 2: Perception

Example
Verbal
Nonverbal/Behavioral
Environmental

Participant’s belief about
Responses reflect:
whether or not the
Yes/No/Unsure,
incident was racially
Questioning
motivated

Phase 3: Reaction

Participant’s immediate
response to the incident

Healthy Paranoia
Sanity Check
Empowering and Validating
Self
Rescuing Offenders

Phase 4: Interpretation

The meaning the
participant makes of the
incident, answering such
questions as: Why did
the event occur? What
were the person’s
intentions?

You Do Not Belong
You Are Abnormal
You Are Intellectually
Inferior
You Are Not Trustworthy
You Are All The Same

Behavioral, emotive, or
thought processes which
develop over time as a
result of said incident.

Powerlessness
Invisibility
Forced Compliance, Loss of
Integrity
Pressure To Represent
One’s Group

Phase 5: Consequence
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